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Abstract
We generalize the results obtained by Braid (2008) and Beladi et al. (2014) for
any non-negative, increasing, continuous function of distance as transportation cost
function. By doing so, we show that in a duopoly, partial privatization does not
change the socially optimal character of the Nash equilibrium location. Our results
call for further research on testing their robustness under the existence of more than
two competing rms.
JEL classication: L13; L32; L33; R32
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1 Introduction
The role of the type of transportation costs has been widely highlighted in the literature
of spatial competition. More specically, dAspremont et al. (1979) showed that in the
traditional Hotellings model (Hotelling, 1929), the nature of travel costs is important for the
existence of an equilibrium; an equilibrium exists when transportation costs are proportional
to the square of distance while it doesnt when the travel costs are linear. Economides (1986)
generalized the results of dAspremont et al. (1979) showing that equilibria exist for a family
of non-linear transportation costs functions of the form f(d) = d; 1    2. It should
be noted, however, that Economides(weak) generalization refers only to the cases where
the second-stage competition (in the rst-stage rms compete in locations) is à la Bertrand
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(since it is based on the Hotellings model). An alternative form of (second-stage) price
competition is the so-called spatial price discrimination introduced by Hoover (1937) and
Lerner and Singer (1937).1 In this type of competition rms bear transportation costs and set
delivered price schedules. Building upon this form of competition Braid (2008) constructed
a duopoly model where rms enjoy monopoly power due to the fact that only two out of the
three goods demanded by all consumers can be o¤ered by a single rm. He demonstrated that
under linear transportation costs the Nash equilibrium locations of the rms coincide with
the socially optimal locations. Extending Braids framework (and by keeping the assumption
of linear transportation costs) to account for a partly privatized public company, Beladi et
al. (2014) proved that the results are equivalent to those in Braid (2008) (i.e., the Nash
equilibrium locations are socially optimal and equal to Braids results) and as a consequence
the degree of privatization of the public rm does not a¤ect the equilibrium locations. In this
paper, we attempt to answer the following main question: Are Braid (2008) and Beladi et
al. (2014) ndings sensitive to the type of transportation costs? Our analysis concludes that
their results hold for any non-negative, increasing, continuous transportation costs function.
Based on the discussion so far, this conclusion constitutes an indication that in this family
of spatial competition models, the form of transportation costs is not as crucial as in models
à la Hotelling.
2 Model and results
Our setting follows that of Braid (2008). We consider a duopoly, with a continuum of
consumers uniformly distributed over the interval [0; 1] of a linear city. Three products are
o¤ered to consumers; J and K from rm D1 and K and L from rm D2. Marginal costs
of production are constant and without any loss of generality are set equal to 0. Let the
fraction of consumers buying only good J equal that of those buying only good L equal to
c.2 Product K is bought by a fraction b of consumers. The above assumptions imply that
1This type of spatial price competition has been extensively used in the relevant literature (see Anderson
et al. (1992)).
2It can be easily shown that our results hold even if the fraction of consumers buying good J is di¤erent
from that of those buying only good L.
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the two rms have monopoly power over the goods J and L. Let k denote the maximum
reservation price that the consumers are willing to pay for a good. Evidently, D1 and D2
will charge a uniform price innitesimally below k for J and L. Spatial price discrimination
à la Lerner and Singer (1937) is assumed regarding product K, where Nash equilibrium in
delivered price schedules exists.3 The location of D1 and D2 over the interval [0; 1] is x
and y, respectively. D1 is privately owned whereas D2 is partly privately owned and partly
publicly owned in proportions a and 1   a, respectively with a 2 [0; 1]. Transportation
costs are equal to f(d), where d is the distance shipped and f any non-negative, increasing,
continuous function. D1 and D2 simultaneously choose their location in the market.
The aggregate shipping distance (for all locations z of consumers along the interval [0; 1])
is equal to
T (x; y) = c
Z x
0
f(x  z)dz +
Z 1
x
f(z   x)dz

+ b
Z x
0
f(x  z)dz +
Z s
x
f(z   x)dz

+b
Z y
s
f(y   z)dz +
Z 1
y
f(z   y)dz

+c
Z y
0
f(y   z)dz +
Z 1
y
f(z   y)dz

(1)
where s is the location of the indi¤erent consumer with f(y   s) = f(s   x). Let
F (d) :=
R
f(d). Then (1) can be written as
T (x; y) = c[ F (0) + F (x) + F (1  x)  F (0)] + b[ F (0) + F (x) + F (s  x)  F (0)]
+b[ F (0) + F (y   s) + F (1  y)  F (0)]
+c[ F (0) + F (y) + F (1  y)  F (0)] (1b)
In order to nd the socially optimal Nash equilibrium locations we have to minimize (1b)
with respect to x and y taking into account that f(y   s) = f(s   x). Hence, the socially
3This implies that the price charged for K by the rm that is closer to the consumer is equal to (or
innitesimally less than) the delivered cost of the rm that is further away. Delivered costs coincide with
transportation costs due to the assumption of zero marginal production costs.
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optimal locations satisfy the rst order conditions:
@T (x; y)
@x
= b
@s
@x
[f(s  x)  f(y   s)] + b[f(x) + f(s  x)] + c[f(x)  f(1  x)]
= b[f(x)  f(s  x)] + c[f(x)  f(1  x)] = 0 (2)
@T (x; y)
@y
= b
@s
@y
[f(s  x)  f(y   s)] + b[f(y   s)  f(1  y)] + c[f(y)  f(1  y)]
= b[f(y   s)  f(1  y)] + c[f(y)  f(1  y)] = 0 (3)
Following Braid (2008), the prot functions of D1 and D2 when both rms are privately
owned (i.e. when a = 1) are:
D1(x; y) = ck   c
Z x
0
f(x  z)dz +
Z 1
x
f(z   x)dz

+b
Z x
0
[f(y   z)  f(x  z)]dz + b
Z s
x
[f(y   z)  f(z   x)]dz
= ck   c[F (x) + F (1  x)] + b[F (y)  F (x)] + b[ F (y   s)  F (s  x)] (4)
D2(x; y) = ck   c
Z y
0
f(y   z)dz +
Z 1
y
f(z   y)dz

+b
Z y
s
[f(z   x)  f(y   z)]dz + b
Z 1
y
[f(z   x)  f(z   y)]dz
= ck   c[F (y) + F (1  y)] + b[ F (y   s)  F (s  x)]
+b[F (1  x)  F (1  y)] (5)
Therefore, the Nash equilibrium locations when both rms are privately owned is given
by the solution of the following system of equations:
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@D1(x; y)
@x
=  b[f(x)  f(s  x)]  c[f(x)  f(1  x)] = 0 (6)
@D2(x; y)
@y
=  b[f(y   s)  f(1  y)]  c[f(y)  f(1  y)] = 0 (7)
Following Beladi et al. (2014), when a 2 [0; 1), the prot function of D2 is
^D2(x; y) = ck   c
Z y
0
f(y   z)dz +
Z 1
y
f(z   y)dz

+b
Z y
s
[f(z   x)  f(y   z)]dz
+b
Z 1
y
[f(z   x)  f(z   y)]dz + (1  a)g(x; y) (8)
where
g(x; y) = ck   c
Z x
0
f(x  z)dz +
Z 1
x
f(z   x)dz

+b
Z x
0
[f(y   z)  f(x  z)]dz
+b
Z s
x
[f(y   z)  f(z   x)]dz + b
Z s
0
[k   f(y   z)]dz
+b
Z 1
s
[k   f(z   x)]dz
= ck   c
Z x
0
f(x  z)dz +
Z 1
x
f(z   x)dz

 b
Z x
0
f(x  z)dz   b
Z 1
x
f(z   x)dz + b
Z 1
0
kdz (9)
At this point we have to note that D2s prots are expressed as the weighted average of
its prots and social welfare (the sum of consumerssurplus and rmsprots) with a being
the weight term. Hence, g(x; y) is the sum of consumerssurplus and D1s prots.
The Nash equilibrium locations under a 2 [0; 1) satisfy (6) and
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@^D2(x; y)
@y
= 0 (10)
However, since (9) does not depend on y, @^D2 (x;y)
@y
=
@D2 (x;y)
@y
.
It can be easily noted that the systems of (2) and (3), (6) and (7) and (6) and (10) are
equivalent and therefore have the same solution.
The above analysis leads to the following propositions:
Proposition 1 The Nash equilibrium locations for a 2 [0; 1] are socially optimal under any
non-negative, increasing, continuous transportation costs function.
Proposition 2 The degree of privatization does not a¤ect the socially optimal Nash equilib-
rium locations under any non-negative, increasing, continuous transportation costs function.
Proposition 3 The Nash equilibrium locations for a 2 [0; 1) are equal to those for a = 1
under any non-negative, increasing, continuous transportation costs function.
Propositions 1, 2 and 3 apart from proving the results obtained by Braid (2008) and Beladi
et al. (2014) at the same time in complete generality, they establish, most importantly, their
independence from the linear nature of the original model.
The key observation behind the invariance of the socially optimal Nash equilibrium loca-
tions when rm D2 is partly privatized is that the summand accounting for the welfare in its
prot function, ^D2(x; y), is, in fact, independent of its location y regardless of the degree
of privatization a.
Putting together the above results with the ndings by Cremer et al. (1991), it emerges
that these are duopoly results having nothing to do with the quadratic transportation costs
considered in Cremer et al. (1991).4
3 Conclusion
We show that Braid (2008) and Beladi et al. (2014) conclusions are robust for any non-
negative, increasing, continuous transportation costs function. As a result of this general-
4Cremer et al. (1991) do not assume a duopoly.
6
ization, we establish that the above conclusions are direct consequences of the duopolistic
competition for di¤erentiated products. Examining the robustness of our ndings under a
two-dimensional spatial framework with more than two competing rms constitutes a topic
for future research.
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